Executive Summary

The United Nations Stabilization Mission to Haitiís (MINUSTAHís) mandate provides the framework for assisting Haiti in building a sustainable peace, however it has been applied without using the creative tools the UN has available to it. Traditional UN missions are well equipped to observe a ceasefire between two warring parties that have entered into a peace accord and handle issues of state security, but in countries like Haiti where individual security is the path to sustainable peace, the UN has yet to develop a viable intervention.

Unless MINUSTAHís mandate is reevaluated and reinterpreted to focus on human security, the mission can not contribute to a sustainable peace in Haiti and UN Member States will continue to violate their legal obligations.

Basis for this Report

At the request of Loune Viaud , the 2002 Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Laureate and Director of Strategic Planning and Operations at Zanmi Lasante (Partners in Health), a socio medical complex with several clinics throughout the Central Plateau the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights (CHR) fielded three delegations to Haiti in June, July and August 2004. Delegates traveled to the Central Plateau and Port au Prince, meeting with local communities, NGO leaders and community-based health workers. They also met with UN troops and officials including the force commander MINUSTAH, then-acting head of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and officials at various embassies in Port-au-Prince.

UN Member States are Violating International Human Rights Law

Development and security cannot be addressed in two phases in Haiti, a sequencing that is generally appropriate with peace-keeping missions following armed conflict. It is impossible to secure Haiti without prioritizing the reestablishment and expansion to rural areas of basic state functions, especially the construction of infrastructure and the provision of basic services.

Clearly, it is not the intention of the UN to violate the Haitian peopleís human rights and to fail to maximize its contribution to creating stability. Nonetheless, as currently implemented, MINUSTAH does not meet either UN or its Member States human rights obligations. The ongoing violations of human rights on the ground, demonstrate a limited understanding by the UN and members of the Security Council of Haitiís source of instability, how the bureaucratic limits of the UN interfere with the organizationís ability to achieve its goals and the Member Statesí lack of political imagination. There are numerous journal articles, as well as publications from international organizations (including the UN) that speak of human security as the building block for sustained peace, but it has not yet been integrated into the major peace-keeping efforts.

Member Statesí Legal Obligations. Under international human rights law, States are required to respect and protect human rights in all settings, including the UN. This obligation imposes a duty on States to ensure that international interventions, including peacekeeping missions, are respectful of human rights and maximize their contribution toward the realization of human rights.

While some remain skeptical that there is a legal obligation under human rights law that compels Members States to provide economic assistance, it is clear that once the international community decides to intervene, it must do so in compliance with its human rights obligations.

Human Security and Human Rights Based Approach. The UN has been struggling with operationalizing its human security model and trying to implement a human rights based approach as it was directed to do by the UN Secretary General in 1997 and 2001. Haiti provides the ideal opportunity to do both by using the human rights based approach to operationalize the human security model. By implementing a human rights based approach that listens to, assesses, and responds to the human rights priorities of the Haitian people and in turn builds the governmentís capacity, the UN will be securing Haitianís individual rights and thereby human security. This will maximize the transformative potential of the reconstruction process and help to build a human rights culture in Haiti. Without human security there can be no state security and MINUSTAH will be unable to assist Haiti in building a lasting peace.

Implementing a rights based approach focused on human security, requires amending MINUSTAHís operation to assist the government in building its capacity to meet, not only its right to security and due process obligations by working with the police force and judiciary, but also helping to build its capacity to respond to its right to water, health, and education obligations by working with the ministries of health, public works and education.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of the RFK Memorialís missions to Haiti and the tools and resources available to the UN, RFK Memorial recommends the following changes to MINUSTAHís:

1. A reevaluation of MINUSTAHís operation and implementation of mandate to conform with international human rights legal obligations.

2. The implementation of a human rights based approach to operationalize human security as the core goal of intervention, by developing programs that assist the government in building its capacity to respond to right to health, water and education, in addition to existing plans to build the capacity of the police and judicial system.

3. Revise the budget to put the correct personnel, through appropriate UN agencies, on the ground for the task at hand and to provide for the needed programs to stabilize Haiti.

4. A recognition that political violence is linked to the lack of a political accord between all relevant parties and that a real political accord is necessary to address this problem.

The United Nations Stabilization Mission to Haitiís (MINUSTAHís) mandate provides the framework for assisting Haiti in building a sustainable peace, however it has been applied without using the creative tools the UN has available to it. Traditional UN missions are well equipped to observe a ceasefire between two warring parties that have entered into a peace accord and handle issues of state security, but in countries like Haiti where individual security is the path to sustainable peace, the UN has yet to develop a viable intervention. Although its current intervention in Haiti, is run as a typical peace-keeping mission, MINUSTAH lacks the basic premise of any peace-keeping mission, a political accord between all parties. This omission has resulted in continued political violence in Haiti. In addition, as recent events, including the floods and thousands of (often) preventable deaths, have shown, the violence in Haiti extends far beyond the political sphere. Haitians continue to die because the government cannot fulfill basic rights to clean water, health, and education. The root causes of Haitiís instability stem, in part, from the systematic violations of the right to health, water and life, as well as rights to security and due process.

Unless MINUSTAHís mandate is reevaluated and reinterpreted to focus on human security, the mission can not contribute to a sustainable peace in Haiti and UN Member States will continue to violate their legal obligations.

In August 2000, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, serving as chair of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations expressed concern that the United Nations (UN), having gained considerable expertise in traditional peacekeeping operations, had yet to ìacquire the capacity needed to deploy more complex operations and to sustain them effectively.î [1] More than four years later, Haiti is suffering from that lack of expertise. MINUSTAH, although aware of the complex situation on the ground in Haiti, particularly the lack of a political accord and involvement of all political actors, is using the wrong tool of traditional peace-keepers, for the challenge it is facing. By applying the wrong tool, UN Member States are squandering precious resources and are violating their own obligations under international human rights law.

The UN has long spoken of the need for a human security-based response in complex situations like Haiti, but has never been able to operationalize it. Unless the UN is willing to place human security at the center of its mission in Haiti now by employing a human rights based approach, MINUSTAH will fail to facilitate a stable and secure Haiti.

In recent months, the international community has been highly critical of the U.S. governmentís role in Iraq. Allegations of international humanitarian and human rights law violations have been of great concern amongst UN Member States and yet that concern has not carried over to Haiti. Daily violations of the right to life, security, health, water and education and the international communitiesí human rights obligations have not been addressed by the Security Council or MINUSTAH. In fact, where the UN and many of it Member States have been vocal about international legal obligations related to Iraq, it has been suspiciously silent about the violations of international legal obligations related to Haiti. Scholars have begun to speculate why the Member States, particularly those who have taken principled stances for the rights of most people, have not taken a stand against MINUSTAHís failure to address human rights violations in Haiti. ìThe basic reason why the Brazilian government has committed this error [sent forces to Haiti] is the desire to make amends with the Americans [in reference to Iraq.]î[2] Whatever the reason behind this silent, the silence must cease and the UN must begin to address the human security need in Haiti. Member States have legal obligations, whether the context is Iraq or Haiti and they must be taken account in its current intervention.

This paper provides a framework for reevaluating and amending the current interpretation of the MINUSTAH mandate discussing the I.) Basis for RFK Memorialís report, II.) how MINUSTAH fails to address the reality in Haiti, III.) Member Statesí violations of international human rights law, and IV) A view from the field. The report concludes with its recommendations for reevaluating and amending its current interpretation of MINUSTAHís mandate.

I. Basis for this Report

In 2002, the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights (CHR) presented its annual human rights award to Loune Viaud from Haiti. Ms. Viaud is the Director of Strategic Planning and Operations at Zanmi Lasante (Partners in Health), a socio medical complex with several clinics throughout the Central Plateau of Haiti. She is a long time human rights activist, advocating for the human right to health for all Haitians. In May 2004, because of her growing concern about the further deterioration of the Haitian governmentís ability to fulfill its human rights obligations and the impact on the right to health and related rights, Ms. Viaud asked CHR to lead a series of missions to Haiti.

This report is based on three missions to Haiti in July and August 2004. Delegates traveled to the Central Plateau and Port au Prince, meeting with local communities, NGO leaders and community-based health workers. They also met with UN Brazilian troops who were based in Hinche, UN officials including the force commander MINUSTAH, then-acting head of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and officials at various embassies in Port-au-Prince. They traveled to Thomonde, Mirabalais, MaÔsade, Cange, Hinche and Benekol.

II. MINUSTAH Fails to Address Reality in Haiti

MINUSTAHís mandate began on June 1, 2004. It is a stabilization mission authorized, ìto ensure a secure and stable environmentî in Haiti.[3] Although the mandate and circumstance call for a non-traditional peacekeeping mission, MINUSTAH is organized by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and is structured as a traditional mission. MINUSTAH does not have the appropriate personnel or budget to deal with the complex situation that exists in Haiti today. It is focused on troops and state security with no provision for human security and the mission is focused solely on civil and political human rights.[4] Further, as of yet, it has been unable to fulfill its mandate of improving the security situation in Haiti. Although the Secretary Generalís recent report notes an improvement in the security situation in Haiti[5], recent outbreaks of violence in Gonaives and Port au Prince, and the CHR missionsí observations, demonstrate that things not stable or secure.

The UN arrived in Haiti to deal with an atypical conflict. There was no hot war in Haiti as is typically the case when the UN peace-keepers deployed in countries like Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and other mission countries. In Haiti, according to various embassy staff that the RFK Memorial delegates spoke with, an estimated 250-300 rebels facilitated the ouster of President Aristide. Although there was political violence in the weeks and even months leading up to his ouster, it was not a traditional war by any stretch of the imagination. Most of Haiti was not in any kind of theatre of conflict.

What existed to some degree in Haiti was a dysfunctional state and armed cadres vaguely linked with the government and then opposition political parties. The political leaders did not take responsibility for their armed associates. They generally operated in a decentralized manner. The failure to recognize this fact has led to the uncomfortable situation that now exists. While many have guns, there is no formal political structure that takes responsibility. Essentially what this leaves Haiti with are two main political entities, the Fanmi Lavalas and Opposition parties who have not come to any political accord, and the irregular forces associated with, but not claimed by each party. A political framework for peace requires the participation of all parties to the conflict.[6]

Recent reports of confrontations between the Haitian National Police and Lavalas supporters and UN troops and rebels in Gonaives highlight the complexities of the political situation on the ground in Haiti. Although a political agreement was reached in April 2004, the consensus did not include the majority party in Haiti, Fanmi Lavalas and have yet to engage in an agreement. Although MINUSTAH is aware of this, it has been unable to facilitate an accord that includes the party. The armed groups, the rebels and the chimeres, are not claimed by either party and are outside of any political accord. It is important to note that the transitional government does not include members of either the Opposition nor the Lavalas parties. Unless all Haitians, of all political groups are integrated into a political accord, there can be no sustainable peace or stability in Haiti.

In situations like Haitiís, ìwhere there are three or more parties, with a varying commitment to peace,î according to the Brahimi Report, the UN missions put, ìnot only to their own people but peace itself at risk unless they perform their tasks with the competence and efficiency that the task requires and have serious great power backing.î[7] In order to assure that the UN is working competently and efficiently, it must first fully understand the context within which itís working. This includes assessing each partyís commitment to peace in Haiti. It must then develop a mandate implementation plan that addresses the obstacles each party faces in committing to peace and long term stability in Haiti.

As currently constructed, the UN troopsí only mandate is to observe political violence or ìmaintain peaceî and assist the police. As of yet, they have been unable to implement that mandate as they are rarely working with the police. For example, in the Central Plateau, the rebels control most of the towns and the Haitian National Police are largely absent. MINUSTAH is therefore unable to fulfill its mandate of assisting the police and have yet to determine how to interact with the rebels. The violence throughout the country in recent weeks has shown that, although they may be observing political violence, they have been unable to maintain the peace. Peace is not achieved spontaneously by the presence of blue helmets. The UN will be unable to do so until they understand the true climate in Haiti and look beyond their standard peacekeeping model.

In a country like Haiti where the political conflict stems from the inability of government institutions to ensure human security, a peacekeeping mission is a waste of resources at best and a violation of member states international legal obligations at worst. Stability can only be achieved if the UN addresses the root cause of the conflict.

Disarmament.The disarmament program typifies the intrinsic problems MINUSTAH is facing in implementing its mandate. Without a political accord, that includes all relevant parties, none of the arms bearers in Haiti have an incentive to participate in the process because there is no promise of a better future. Typically, in disarmament processes, both sides have agreed to a new framework and are therefore willing to disarm. The UN Secretary General noted the problems to implementing a disarmament program in its August 30, 2004 report and urged the Transitional Government in Haiti to form a commission to create a framework for disarmament. To date no commission has been formed. The Commission, when formed, will likely also have a difficult time constructing a disarmament plan because of the lack of political agreement between the Lavalas, Opposition, Chimeres and ìrebels.î

The transitional Haitian Prime Minister recently tried to address this problem by enticing arms holders on a personal level, understanding that there is no structure in place for them to be part of a larger process. Although ill conceived, this was the premise of the football ìMatch for Peaceî that was originally going to grant admission to a friendly match between Haitian and Brazilian national teams to those who turned in weapons. Although an inappropriate vehicle, the game highlighted the need to look for a non-traditional solution to the problems in Haiti by appealing to people on an individual level. The parties in Haiti are not warring armies with a structure and hierarchy, but loosely affiliated groups.

It is precisely this void in combating human security issues that can be blamed for the increase in rebel activity throughout Haiti. What began as a movement of 250-300 rebels to oust President Aristide has turned into a political movement of thousands of rebels. They are demanding the reinstatement of the army and ten years of back pay. Given the huge unemployment rate, it appears that former military are appearing from the woodwork. The attraction is not ideological, the attraction is that by ìjoiningî the rebels there is a chance to make money. Specifically, joining the military movement can provide personal security for each member of the rebel forces through economic security.

The same can be said for the ìchimeres,î forces associated with, but not officially claimed by the Fanmi Lavalas movement. The chimeres supported President Aristide in part because of their ideologies, but to some degree because they benefited from the spoils of the state and some patronage benefit. Current protests against the transitional government include both a fundamental disagreement of its exclusion and targeting of the Fanmi Lavalas party as well as ongoing frustration that the government is still failing to fulfill its citizensí basic rights.

Until this reality is confronted, MINUSTAH will never be able to bring stability to Haiti. New solutions are needed and the UN has the tools to implement these solutions, but has thus far focused on implementing the models it is comfortable with, not what is needed.

III. UN Member States are Violating International Human Rights Law

Development and security cannot be addressed in two phases in Haiti, a sequencing that is generally appropriate with peace-keeping missions following armed conflict. It is impossible to secure Haiti without prioritizing the reestablishment and expansion to rural areas of basic state functions, especially the construction of infrastructure and the provision of basic services. The mandate of MINUSTAH must be reinterpreted in light of human security. MINUSTAH must take steps, including creating employment (draining support from rebels and chimeras), putting in water and sanitation and improving access to health care, education and justice. Without such a fundamental shift, any peace that is facilitated by MINUSTAH will be temporary and fleeting.

Clearly, it is not the intention of the UN to violate the Haitian peopleís human rights and to fail to maximize its contribution to creating stability. Nonetheless, as currently implemented, MINUSTAH does not meet either UN or its Member States human rights obligations. The ongoing violations of human rights on the ground, demonstrate a limited understanding by the UN and members of the Security Council of Haitiís source of instability, how the bureaucratic limits of the UN interfere with the organizationís ability to achieve its goals. There are numerous journal articles, as well as publications from international organizations (including the UN) that speak of human security as the building block for sustained peace, but it has not yet been integrated into the major peace-keeping efforts. Haiti should be the first place where the UN applies this approach.

For years, UN agencies, humanitarian and development organizations as well as peacekeeping operations have struggled to integrate a human rights-based approach into their operations.[8] The idea is new and its operationalization far from an understood science. Most efforts have resulted in adding human rights experts to missions. These efforts, particularly in peacekeeping and peace-building, have fallen significantly short of the rhetorically desired integration. Here human rights have been limited to a separate section or division of the mission. MINUSTAH, of its 10,019 total requested personnel requirements[9] the human rights program will be staffed by a total of 74 officers.[10] What is more important than the number of Human Rights Officers, is that the mission be viewed through a human rights lens.

In recent years the UN has been looking to alternative models and solutions to make their contributions to peace sustainable, recognizing that conflicts are not limited to traditional hot wars between states or civil wars involving one or more armed factions. The traditional state-based approach to security has served as the basis for UN peacekeeping missions, but this method is in appropriate for conflicts related to dysfunctionality of government combined with targeted political violence. As these traditional methods have not been successful in countries like Haiti, that have suffered endemic disruptions of state function and democracy, the UN has begun looking at alternative solutions.

The reason that MINUSTAH will not be effective in fulfilling its overarching goal of ìstabilizingî Haiti is that the intervention as currently implemented does not address the most frequent and compelling human rights violations. If human rights were taken seriously by the Security Council, contributing Member States and the UN secretariat MINUSTAH would have to be designed differently.

Member Statesí Legal Obligations. Under international human rights law, States are required to respect and protect human rights in all settings, including the UN. This obligation imposes a duty on States to ensure that international interventions, including peacekeeping missions, are respectful of human rights and maximize their contribution toward the realization of human rights.

While some remain skeptical that there is a legal obligation under human rights law that compels Members States to provide economic assistance,[11] it is clear that once the international community decides to intervene, it must do so in compliance with its human rights obligations.[12]

The UN Security Council and Secretariat have placed each Member State in a position to assist Haiti by mandating MINUSTAH and collecting assessed contributions for its budget. However, the deployment of MINUSTAH does not, in and of itself, result in the realization of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Many activities undertaken in the name of peacekeeping or development have subsequently been recognized as ill-conceived and even counter-productive in human rights terms.[13] MINUSTAH is the perfect example of how well-intentioned international actions can be counterproductive. While the UN has committed over $264 million, it has not allocated these funds so as to maximize the realization of the full spectrum of human rights. In order to adequately address the human rights situation in Haiti the UN needs to reconsider how assessed contributions are distributed.

The United Nations has committed $264,811,800 for MINUSTAH for the period of May 1, 2004 through December 2004. Of this only $750,000 has been committed to programming in Haiti. The rest has been committed to funding military and police personnel ($103,111,300), providing health care for the troops and other personnel ($2,908,300), the official travel of UN personnel ($663,600), communications ($17,309,300) and various other operational costs.[14] This $750,000 is devoted to ìquick-impact projects,î including restoring ìservices such as schools, public health facilities, water systems and sold waste clean-up.î[15]

Rather than distributing the whole of the $260 million to basically fielding blue helmets, it would be more effective to allocate a significant portion of these funds to other UN agencies, which are better suited to facilitating changes that are necessary to address the ongoing human rights violations being suffered by the Haitian people. When the UN undertakes a stabilization mission it is necessary that the mission take into account the human rights situation in the host country, and implement the mandate so as to most effectively address human rights. By not maximizing their resources to contribute to the full range of rights of the Haitian people, the UN Members States are violating their obligation to promote human rights.

To say it clearly, the MINUSTAH main expense is blue helmets, but blue helmets can do precious little to address some of the root causes of the instability and create the kind of ambience needed to foster peace. Based on budgets for programs that were developed to provide sustainable solutions to economic and social rights problems in Haiti,[16] putting in the water system may in fact do more to both maximize the Security Councilís contribution to stability and human rights than paying for the blue helmets. For example, the International Development bank estimated that a program could be implemented to assist the government in providing potable water for over 400,000 people for $60 million thus demonstrating that the reallocation of some of the funds committed to the blue helmets could save lives and build the base for peace if used appropriately.[17]

By not doing so, the UN member states are perpetuating violations that manifest themselves daily in deaths resulting from violations of the right to water, health and life. These violations are endemic and have taken more lives in Haiti this year than the much publicized political violence, which without a true political settlement, the blue helmets can also do little to prevent or end. The Member States violations in Haiti can be contrasted with a typical peacekeeping mission after a hot war in which the best way to maximize resources is to employ a blue helmets-based mandate to secure an area before addressing economic, social and cultural rights violations. Haiti is not a typical post-conflict situation, and a model of ìsecuringî the country before addressing the spectrum of human rights does not maximize resources because the security situation is inextricably intertwined with these rights.

Under human rights law, the UN is obligated to review its spending for MINUSTAH and to reallocate the budget in a way that maximizes its contribution to the realization of human rights for the Haitian people. Only then can it measurably and concretely contribute to facilitating a stable Haiti. Blue helmets alone are the wrong tool and their continued use at the exclusion of a more creative and multi-faceted approach violates human rights law.

Human Security. The UN has recognized that as ìsecurity challenges become more complex and various new actors attempt to play a role,î there is a need to shift the paradigm and broaden its focus ìfrom the state to security of the peopleóto human security.î[18] The UN Commission on Human Security has recommended putting human security on the agenda of security organizations at all levels. It is now time for the SC and the UN Secretariat to put this sensible recommendation into practice, not only to greatly improve the chances of success for the mission, but because the law requires it.

The Commission distinguishes state-centered approaches from human security by emphasizing the ìinterconnectedness of poverty and conflict.î Commission member, Sadako Ogata explains that ìinequality and poverty contribute to conflict, whereas the latter, in turn, lead to further inequality and poverty.î[19] Ensuring human security means each individualís obstacles to security. In countries like Haiti the greatest threat to individual security, to the lives of the Haitian people are violations of the right to health, water and education. The governmentís inability to fulfill its rights obligations has contributed to 31 coup díetats in its 200 year history and the recent ouster of President Aristide. A mission that is focused on assisting the police and observing non-existent armed conflict is nothing more than an inter-American training exercise.[20] Haiti must be the country where the human security model is be taken from the discussions and UN studies to an operational mandate on the ground. UN Member Statesí failure to do so is to ignore their human rights obligations and violate international law.

Human Rights Based Approach. The UN has been struggling with operationalizing its human security model. It has also been trying to implement a human rights based approach as it was directed to do by the UN Secretary General in 1997 and 2001. In addition, the Brahimi Report cited the importance of ìthe United Nations system adhering to and promoting international human rights instruments and standards [i]n all aspects of its peace and security activitiesî[21] as a premise for his recommendations on peacekeeping reform. UN agencies came together in May 2003 to develop a Statement of Common Understanding or guidelines for implementing the human rights based approach. The then Acting High Commission for Human Rights, Bertrand Ramchran articulates the clear link between human security and human rights.[22] It is now necessary to apply this legal obligation to radically retool MINUSTAH and give the intervention a chance to succeed.

A human rights based approach puts Haitians at the center of all work in Haiti. To not do so is to undermine the potential efficacy of MINUSTAH. The long term solutions to a sustainable peace can not be found anywhere else. For example, during the visits by our delegations, Haitians in the Central Plateau articulated not only their rights, but proposed solutions to overcome obstacles to accessing potable water, schools for their children and how to fix the roads that prevent access to health clinics. Women, when given a platform to articulate these issues, provided the clearest understanding of the intricate obstacles to fulfilling the rights of their community members, but offered practical solutions to overcoming these obstacles.

The UN has the creative tools it needs and the legal obligation to fulfill its goal of contributing to peace and stability in Haiti. By implementing a human rights based approach that listens to, assesses, and responds to the human rights priorities of the Haitian people and in turn builds the governmentís capacity, the UN will be securing Haitianís individual rights and thereby human security. This will maximize the transformative potential of the reconstruction process and help to build a human rights culture in Haiti. Without human security there can be no state security and MINUSTAH will be unable to assist Haiti in building a lasting peace. Therefore MINUSTAHís mandate needs to be amended from a standard peacekeeping mission to a multi-faceted peace-building mission that addresses both state and individual security.

In order to implement a rights based approach focused on human security, requires amending MINUSTAHís operation to assist the government in building its capacity to meet, not only its right to security and due process obligations by working with the police force and judiciary, but also helping to build its capacity to respond to its right to water, health, and education obligations by working with the ministries of health, public works and education. It requires going into the local communities in Haiti and listening to their self articulated rights priorities and assisting the government in meeting those demands by implementing projects that provide immediate solutions as well as programs to build the long term infrastructure of the government. Unless the government can comply with its rights obligations the UN will continue to find itself returning to Haiti.

1. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, ( Brahimi Report) A/55/305-S/22/809, 21 August 2000, p. 2, para. (h).
2. A raz„o b·sica pela qual o governo brasileiro cometeu esse erro foi o desejo de fazer mÈdia com os americanos. Unger Mangabeir, R. ìAventura Subimperial,î Folha de S. Paulo, 19 October 2004, www.law.harvard.edu/unger.
3. Security Council Resolution 1542, 30 April 2004, para. I (a).
4. Security Council Resolution 1542 speaks broadly to human rights and does not make a distinction between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights, however implementation on the ground and focused solely on civil and political rights. (See Generally the Interim Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, S/2004/698, 30 August 2004).
5. Interim Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, S/2004/698, 30 August 2004, p.3, para. 11.
6. It is important to note that although there were originally two parties involved in the political dispute, Fanmi Lavalas and the Opposition, there are now numerous rebel leaders and chimere leaders that are now involved. A political accord will therefore now somehow encompass all of these groups as well.
7. Brahimi Report, A/55/305-S/200/809, 21 August 2000, p. 4, para. 25.
8. Brahimi Report, A/55/305-S/22/809, 21 August 2000.
9. Interim budget for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the period of 1 May to 31 December 2004, A/58/800, 17 May 2004, p. 3
10. Strengthening national capacities in the field of human rights in Haiti, HAI/04/AH/08, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/coop/latin.htm.
11. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights has been ratified by 149 states. These States are therefore required to comply with associated obligations. ìStatus of Ratification of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, ì Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 2004 Article 2(1) of ICESCR provides that states undertake ìto take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical,î with a view to full realization of the rights enshrined in the treaty. To this end, each state must commit its ìmaximum available resources.î The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), has commented on these obligations in General Comment 3, defining the phrase, ìmaximum available resourcesî as intended by the Covenantís drafters to refer to both the resources existing within the State and those available from the international community through international cooperation and assistance.î ëThe nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par.1)í: 14/12/90. CESCR General Comment 3 (13). (General Comments). These guidelines suggest that Member States who have ratified the ICESCR should provide assistance in fulfilling economic, social and cultural rights are directly applicable to Haiti through MINUSTAH as member states are allocating resources to Haiti through its assessed contributions
12. The Committee asserts, statesí economic and social rights obligations are both individual and collective by emphasizing that in ìaccordance with Article 55[12] of the Charter of the UNî and ìwell-established principles of international lawî and provisions of the Covenant itself, ìinternational cooperation for development and thus for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States.î The committee places particular obligations ìupon those States that are in a position to assist others in this regard.î ëThe nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par.1)í: .14/12/90. CESCR General Comment 3 (14). (General Comments).
13. ìInternational Technical Assistance Measures (Art. 22),î International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 2, para. 6, 02/02/90.
14. ìInterim Budget for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the Period from 1 May to 31 December 2004: Report to the Secretary-General,î General Assembly, A/58/800, 17 May 2004, 2, 7. Note, this is twice the budget of the Haitian governmentís budget if calculated on an annual basis.
15. General Assembly, A/58/800, 17 May 2004, 14.
16. Programs budgets are based on approved loans by the Inter-American Development Bank that were withheld from Haiti for several years but now are in the process of being released.
17. General Assembly, A/58/800, 17 May 2004, 2. Inter-American Development Bank, No. 1010/SF-HA, HA-0014, 12 August 1998, Executive Summary. Inter-American Development Bank, No. 1009/SF-HA, HA-0045, 12 August 1998, Executive Summary.
18. ìOutline of the Report of the Commission on Human Security,í Commission on Human Security, May 1, 2003, p. 1, available at http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/outline.pdf.
19. Report of the Second Meeting of the Commission on Human Security. Commission on Human Security, 16-17 Dec 2001, p. 2, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/meetings/second/index.html.
20. Targeted and localized political violence in Haiti is not and should not be considered an armed conflict.
21. Brahimi Report, A/55/305-S/22/809, 21 August 2000, p.1 para. 6(a).
22. The challenges facing the international community at the present time are such at, without respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the attainment of lasting peace would be impossible and human security illusory (Ramcharan report p.1)
23. Although all community leaders participated in the larger community meeting, many of the women who attended the womenís meeting did not attend the larger community meeting.
24. The troops were based in Hinche and had not traveled much outside of the city. Therefore most interviewees outside of Hinche had not had any contact with the troops.
25. Interim Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, S/2004/698, 30 August 2004, p.3, para. 11.