Haiti provides a challenge to the United Nations. The most impoverished and arguably most unstable country in the Western Hemisphere has been host to a series of failed U.N. missions. For the next mission to Haiti to succeed, the U.N. needs a novel approach that focuses on individual Haitians and their human rights. Typically peace-keeping missions focus on security and stability first and development issues later. Peace consolidation requires dealing with the root causes of instability such as the lack of basic services, violation of economic and social rights, as well as civil and political violations like poor governance. Haiti has long depended on international assistance. Without direct aid to the Haitian government in recent years, many of the countryís infrastructures have collapsed and the government cannot deliver poverty alleviating services that Haitians are entitled to. Further, with a long history of mismanaged international and national funds and little money going directly to the government in the last few years, mechanisms are needed to build the governmentís absorption capacity and transparency. An interdisciplinary peace-building mission would incorporate several U.N. agencies and international actors to address all of these issues from the onset. It would also emphasize the inter-relatedness and inter-dependence of the full spectrum of human rights. The U.N. has the opportunity and obligation to facilitate a durable peace in Haiti.

This paper provides a framework for a U.N. peace-building mission, highlighting the following areas: 1) lessons learned from past U.N. missions to Haiti; 2) U.N. peace-building mission mandate; 3) the human rights-based approach; 4) tasks; 5) operationalizing the tasks; and 6) resources.

I. Lessons learned from past U.N. missions to Haiti
The proposed mission is to be guided by the lessons of past U.N. missions to Haiti. Although many of the obstacles the missions faced were specific to its individual circumstances, general lessons must be drawn from them to ensure that this mission to Haiti is the last one.

The International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) was created in February 1993 to observe the human rights situation in Haiti. It was a joint U.N./OAS mission primarily focused on civil and political human rights monitoring.[1] Later in 1993, the U.N. Security Council mandated the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) which assisted in professionalizing the armed and police forces.[2] Although addressing human rights violations in Haiti, previous U.N. missions did not encompass the full spectrum of human rights.[3] Specifically, there were no mechanisms or programs in place to deal with economic and social rights violations or development needs.

The mission personnel were also ill prepared to begin fulfilling their mandate. They did not have the necessary training or equipment to do their jobs.[4] Without the logistical support and needed expertise, the mission was unable to meet expectations and deliver on mandate promises. This left the population dissatisfied and untrusting of the U.N.ís work in Haiti. Further there were no accountability measures in place to monitor what the mission was doing in Haiti.

Arguably, the greatest lesson to be learned from the U.N. missions and other international interventions in Haiti is that individual Haitianís rights and needs must be central to any work in Haiti. In the past, they are rarely part of a process to determine what would be most beneficial to building a durable peace in Haiti. Their participation is critical to the success of any work in Haiti.

II. U.N. Peace-Building Mission Mandate

Objective: To lay a framework for a durable peace in Haiti by mandating an inter-disciplinary, peace-building mission to Haiti.

The mission will seek to strengthen the capacity of Haitiís institutions in order to build peace through reducing poverty. This will be done by respecting human rights. The overall goal of the mission will be to lay the framework for a culture of human rights which leads to democracy and ultimately a sustainable peace in Haiti.[5]

To facilitate international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Haiti, with particular attention to the countryís extreme poverty and weakness of its government institutions, the mission will address four major areas: 1) the immediate need to alleviate poverty and facilitate stability, including increasing the input of international funding; 2) manage funds that flow into the country; 3) facilitate and monitor the governmentís delivery of services; 4) facilitate and monitor a rights based system where citizens assert their human rights and the government responds. The following program areas will be implemented to fulfill the missionís mandate: (a) health sector development (the Rights to Health and Water and Sanitation programs[6]); (c) education sector development (the Right to Education program); (d) rule of law (the Right to Security of Person and the Right to Liberty and Due Process programs).

All programs in Haiti are to be participatory and include a component which enables Haitians, as rights holders, to articulate their human rights. Attention to dismantling sex discrimination and ensuring gender equality should be integrated throughout. This is especially true when engaging with rights deprivations, such as violations of the right to water or education, which have disproportionate impacts on women and girls. The U.N. mission and its partners will establish a process with the government to empower Haitians to express their rights and work to build the capacity of appropriate ministries to respond to those rights. This will be accomplished using agreed-upon specific benchmarks and a common timeline. A complaint mechanism will be established to ensure that those rights are being realized.

III. Human Rights-Based Framework

Haitiís current instability stems, in part, from the governmentís inability to respect the basic rights of its citizens.[7] The international community, through the U.N., multi-lateral organizations, and bilateral donors, spent millions of dollars in Haiti, but has not helped Haitians to realize their human rights. The model of purely humanitarian aid[8] and funneling money exclusively through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in recent years has undermined the development of a human rights culture in Haiti by weakening the governmentís capacity to respond to its citizens. The future peace-building mission must shift the approach from an input-based model that treats Haitians as humanitarian victims to an outcome-based model that recognizes Haitians as rights holders and promotes long- term sustainability.

In accordance with the U.N. Secretary Generalís call in 1997 and 2002 for the integration of human rights into all areas of the U.N. system, U.N. agencies have incorporated a human rights-based approach into their policy plans, but implementation and experimentation have been slow. Organizations such as UNDP, the U.N. Childrenís Fund (UNICEF), and the U.N. Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) have incorporated human rights-based policies.[9] WHO is also developing its human rights strategy.

The U.N. Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and DPKO have not made a sufficiently serious attempt to integrate these policies into their conceptualization of the U.N.ís role in building peace, but rather have been content to simply add a few human rights officers to its field missions. To date, human rights based policies have not translated into the on-the-ground work of the U.N. system in Haiti. Haiti provides the opportunity to use these tools to effect concrete change.

Several U.N. agencies met in May 2003[10] at the Second Interagency Workshop on Implementing a Human Right-Based Approach in the Context of U.N. Reform to coordinate their human rights-based policies.[11] The framework for the U.N. peace-building mission to Haiti is to be guided by the Common Understanding principles agreed to at the workshop including the following components:

1. Program implementation will be guided by the human rights violations that individual Haitians articulate.

2. The U.N. will help build the capacity of the Haitian government and other duty bearers to respond to its citizensí rights.

3. The peace-building mission will ensure that the citizens can make demands on their government when their rights are being violated and have those complaints resolved.

4. The U.N. is accountable for its actions. Its work will be monitored. It will enter Haiti with an exit strategy already in place, defining and meeting clear benchmarks. The U.N. Mission will close when it has facilitated the achievement of those benchmarks.

IV. Tasks

The proposed peace-building programs were developed to actualize three main goals:

1) stabilizing the situation in Haiti 2) addressing the root causes of instability and 3) providing a sustainable peace. Sector development programs highlight the targeted human rights and their legal basis to build a human rights culture that emphasizes the duty-bearerís obligation and reinforces the Haitiansí claim to these rights.

1. Stabilizing the situation in Haiti. Rebels still control much of Haiti and the police force is unable to stabilize the situation. The recent climate of violence in Haiti highlights that the police force is under-staffed and ill-equipped to protect its citizens. It is instructive to note that less than 4000[12] police officers are charged with protecting the rights of eight million Haitians, many of whom live in remote rural areas, whereas New York City which has a similar population, but more concentrated geography, has a force of 36,000 police officers.[13]

The judicial system remains weak and unable to effectively process legal actions. Immediate and long-term stability in Haiti cannot be achieved without strengthening the police force and judicial system. Further, the numerous rebel groups controlling the country must be disarmed and demobilized and eventually reintegrated into society. Where appropriate, individuals who have participated in human rights violations must be prosecuted.[14]

Developing the Rule of Law
The Right to Security of Person:

Haitiansí right to security of person is provided for in the Haitian Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)[15] to which the Haitian government is a state party.

The priority outcomes of the Right to Security of Person program, working with the recently deployed multi-national force, should be to: 1) establish order; 2) disarm and demobilize mobilize all irregular forces and where appropriate, reintegrate these individuals into civil society; and 3) build the capacity of the Haitian police force. It is estimated that Haiti needs a police force of 15-20,000 officers in order to maintain security throughout the country. Capacity-building strategies will include recruiting and training a sufficiently staffed police force to ensure the Haitian populationís long-term security.

The Right to Liberty and Due Process:

The rights to liberty and due process are protected by the Haitian Constitution and the ICCPR.[16] The judicial system in Haiti developed under almost 200 years of dictatorship and grossly lacks the personnel and professionalism to combat impunity and fulfill its due process obligations as evidenced by the severe overcrowding of jails and the doubling of the number of inmates detained since 1995 (80% of whom were awaiting disposition of their cases before the beginning of the recent crisis).[17] The U.N. mission will work with the Haitian Ministry of Justice to build its capacity, through judicial trainings, legal aid projects, and other relevant programs, to fulfill its rights obligations and strengthen the rule of law.

2. Root causes of instability. The root causes of instability in Haiti centrally include the governmentís inability to delivery primary and basic social services and economic development services. Previous U.N. missions focused on establishing ìorderî while ignoring economic and social rights. This omission, combined with the international communityís suspension of direct aid to the Haitian government, beginning in 2001, has contributed to dysfunctional (and in many rural areas almost non-existent) health, water and sanitation, and education infrastructures. Without the equal weighing and realization of these rights, Haiti will be unable to build a true human rights culture. The following programs therefore focus on core economic and social rights.

Developing the Health Sector
The Right to Health

While the Haitian Constitution guarantees the right to health,[18] that country exhibits dire health indicators, including the highest HIV prevalence rate and highest mortality rate for children[19] in the hemisphere; and the only declining life expectancy in the hemisphere. In the short term, the U.N. will work with the government to complete short term projects including providing basic medical care. In the long term, the U.N. mission will facilitate the necessary allocation and technical support outcome priorities that ensure the Ministryís ability to build its capacity to realize its citizensí right to health. Further, the Right to Health Program, in accordance with the stated priorities of the National Strategic Plan and in adherence with WHO guidelines, will be charged with meeting the priority outcomes, as determined by local field offices working with individual communities (e.g. increasing the number of Haitians who have access to medical care and decreasing infant mortality rates).

Development of the Water and Sanitation Sector
The Right to Water and Sanitation

The right to water and sanitation derives from the right to health and the right to life. Haiti ranks 147th out of 147 countries in the Water Poverty Index and is characterized by a the high prevalence of deaths associated with water-borne diseases; the U.N. mission must provide adequate resources and support to build the Ministry of Public Worksí capacity to respond to its citizens right to water and sanitation. Short term projects will include public works projects that can deliver potable water as quickly as possible. Longer term priority outcomes for the Right to Water program should include increasing Haitiansí access to potable water and thus decreasing the number of deaths associated with water borne diseases.[20]

Development of the Education Sector
The Right to Education

As guaranteed by the Haitian Constitution and the Convention on the Rights of the Child[21] to which Haiti is a party, Haitians have a fundamental right to education. Haiti suffers from a low percentage of children enrolled in school and an attendant low literacy rate in Haiti. Recognizing the inter-relatedness of formal education to building a human rights culture, the U.N. mission is to be charged with meeting its priority outcome of providing support and resources to build the Ministry of Educationís capacity to respond to its citizensí right to education. The steps to realizing the Right to Education program will include the operationalization of pre-determined educational norms and standards developed by the Ministry of Education in collaboration with UNESCO as part of the national ëEducation toward Developmentí campaign. The mission would work to assist the government in ensuring an increase in the number of Haitian children enrolled in school, implement a rigorous monitoring and evaluation protocol toward achieving and maintaining the quality of education, and increase Haitiís national literacy rate.

3. Sustainability

Monitoring and Accountability (Creating and meeting benchmarks). A human rights culture cannot function or be sustainable without monitoring and holding the government accountable.[22] The U.N. and international actors will be dominant actors in many respects and therefore must be held accountable as well. A clear exit strategy must be developed which establishes outcome benchmarks for each program to ensure this accountability. The outcome benchmarks for each program include improving the independent indicators that denote progress towards achieving Haitiansí rights, as well as meeting benchmarks for infrastructure and systems development that measure governmental capacity to fulfill rights. For example, the Health Sector Development project will establish a base line percentage to determine an increase in access to medical care and a decrease in infant mortality, as set forth at the onset of the program.[23] The program could determine a 25 percent increment measure for both indicators as the goal. Similarly, the program will assess the quality and capacity of existing infrastructure and health systems as base line measures. The program would then identify required systems and capacities that must be in place before the program can be considered a success. Each program is to go through a similar process of establishing and meeting benchmark indicators.

As part of an exit strategy, each program is to demonstrate that the relevant complaint mechanism is functioning appropriately by showing that citizens are utilizing it and receiving an adequate resolution to their complaints. This mechanism will hold the Haitian government accountable for fulfilling its human rights obligations. The relevant government ministries should also demonstrate that they have the capacity to maintain and improve their responses to citizensí rights.

Benchmarks will also be created to monitor incoming funds. The mission will work with the government to set benchmarks for legal reform, accountability and transparency mechanisms to ensure the government is using funds as intended. The mechanisms will allow Haitian citizens to track the governmentís expenditures and a functioning complaint system will provide an avenue for Haitians to address any discrepancies. These mechanisms will be incorporated into the missionís exit strategy.

V. Operationalizing the Tasks

1. Implementing the proposed peace-building missionís framework

The U.N. missionís structure will include field offices throughout the country and a main headquarters. The headquarters will coordinate experience and information sharing between field offices, serve as a liaison to the U.N. agency headquarters, and facilitate a prompt flow of funding and necessary political support for the mission.[24] A multi-disciplinary team of peace-building personnel from relevant U.N., other international agencies, or personnel seconded from other countries will operationalize the programs within their respective fields. Each field office will also work with locals in each program area. Local staff will provide existing expertise, work to facilitate the process between the citizens and the government, and build the local governmentís capacity. Eventually, this process will be transferred to the government and local partners to continue this work.[25] As part of the exit strategy, international staff will be limited to regional offices and mission headquarters. The following specialized experts will be needed to implement the proposed programs:[26]

1. Security Specialists: Security experts will be charged with building the Haitian police forceís capacity and disarming and demobilizing the civilian population. Experts can be drawn from the Organization of American States (OAS), DPKO or seconded from donor countries.

2. Health Specialists:: Technical experts will work with the Ministry of Health at the local and national levels to operationalize the Right to Health Program. They can be drawn from WHO or specific bilateral donors (i.e. Brazil or Cuba may offer to take responsibility for the health sector and send health experts to Haiti).

3. Public Works Specialists: :Staff from international financial institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank or World Bank will work with the Ministry of Public Works to build the necessary capacity and infrastructure to operationalize the Right to Water Program. Experts can also be seconded from donor countries.

4. Education Specialists: :Officers from a donor country, UNICEF, or UNESCO will work with the Ministry of Education to develop the educational sector.

5. Rule of Law Specialists:: Experts from the OAS, UNDP or individual donor countries will take responsibility for working with the Ministry of Justice to build its capacity to increase the rule of law in Haiti.

6. Haitiansí Advocates:: Experts from the OHCHR or donor countries will work with community groups to make sure individual Haitians are actively participating in the programsí processes to assert their rights and ensure they know how to use the complaint mechanisms and are not afraid to file complaints. Advocates will make sure Haitiansí can file complaints against their own government, the UN, and international donors and that they are utilizing those mechanisms as appropriate.

7. Governance and Democracy Education Specialists: : Officers from the OAS, DPA or donor countries will conduct trainings about the role of citizens and the government, highlighting citizensí rights and the governmentís responsibilities.

8. Womenís Rights Specialists: :Officers from UNIFEM or donor countries will be charged with ensuring that womenís rights are articulated by working with local womenís groups and the Haitiansí advocates. They will also work with government ministries to ensure they have the capacity to address human rights issues raised by Haitian women.

The overarching programs as defined in this paper will differ operationally depending on the specific sectoral development programs and human rights violations occurring in each locale; however, the following steps can be applied throughout the country:

1. Peace-building personnel facilitate a process with local government to listen to Haitians articulate their primary human rights violations.

2. Mission personnel work with government to determine what it can do to with international assistance to actualize those rights.

3. The government with the U.N. will report back to the citizens about what action they will take, ensuring that the process is transparent.[28]

4. Implementation of these projects.

5. Officers work with the citizens to file a formal complaint with the appropriate body if the government fails to meet its obligations.

6. Once the capacity of the local actors and government can support this process, the international staff will move to the regional offices and mission headquarters.

For example, applying this model in the health sector program, field office health specialists would work with local communities and the government to implement the program by including the following steps:

1. Facilitate a dialogue between the government and local community who will articulate the violations citizens faced as pertains to their right to health.

2. For example, if the community explains that it has been denied access to medication, the U.N. field health specialist will work with the local Ministry of Health to determine what medications it can provide for the community with the international communityís assistance.

3. The government will report to the community about its specific programmatic plans (i.e. plans to distribute medication and create adequate infrastructure to support distribution, patient education and follow-up).

4. Implementation of medical distribution program.

5. U.N. field staff will work with citizens to file a complaint with the Ministry of Health if the medication is not distributed, or if adequate supportive services are not provided.

6. Once the local staff and actors have the capacity to facilitate this process between the Ministry of Health and the community, international staff will move to the regional office and mission headquarters.

Similarly, the educational specialists may respond to a communityís assertion that they do not have the teachers necessary to educate their children. The officer would then follow a similar process in building the Ministry of Educationís capacity to realize the right to education in that particular community.

2. Practical Considerations in Implementing the Peace-Building Mission Framework

A. Logistics and current capacity

The obstacles related to logistics and capacity-building in Haiti today are greater than they were prior to February 2004. Already extremely weak, government ministries were targets of looting, damage and theft, in recent months. In many cases, vehicles were stolen and local offices were destroyed.[29] All government ministers were appointed in March 2004. Their experiences vary, but none have previously served as ministers and therefore may lack the technical capacity to implement programs quickly. Similarly, many local government officials with expertise and knowledge of the local structures and capacities are in hiding for fear of reprisals by anti-Aristide contingents.[30]

Structural problems, such as absorption capacity, continue to exist. After several years of withholding aid to the government, the international community will undoubtedly begin sending funds to the ministries again. Technical assistance is critical to ensure funds can be absorbed appropriately and transparently, while avoiding corruption. In order to address archaic procedures within the ministries, the president used discretionary funds to expedite programs. In response to widespread accusations of misuse of discretionary funds and to facilitate transparency, legal reforms will need to eliminate these funds and update internal ministerial procedures.

A great deal of expertise exists within Haiti. Among government officials, local NGOs and other organizations (e.g. faith based organizations) many have been working to mobilize communities for years. This experience will be invaluable when facilitating a process for Haitians to articulate their rights. In addition, many ministries have developed national strategic plans to fulfill their human rights obligations. The Ministry of Healthís national strategic plan is noteworthy as it incorporates a human rights-based approach. Further, Haiti was the first country to receive a grant from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. In some instances, the infrastructure and expertise necessary to carry out these projects exists and should be utilized where appropriate. The peace-building mission should work within the existing frameworks developed by the ministries where possible.

B. Role of NGOs

Working with international NGOs to shift their approach to a rights-based one will be a challenge in many cases. As international aid has flowed primarily through international NGOs in recent years, such private organizations have been seen as the deliverer of services, while the governmentís capacity and infrastructure have suffered. A number of NGOs simply hand out food or other services without providing a means for long-term sustainability. Although this aid provided many Haitians a means for survival, its continuation would undermine the development of a human rights culture in Haiti; NGOs should now be challenged to adopt a new approach.

A few NGOs, however, have consistently operated through a rights-based approach, notably Zanmi Lasante (Partners in Health), located in Cange. Zanmi Lasante works with local communities in the Central Plateau to fulfill the right to health as articulated by the patientsí own bill of rights, the Cange Declaration.[31] The Declaration enumerates the specific components of the right to health, as interpreted by the local community (i.e. access to medication and quality health care). Zanmi Lasante has been working with the Ministry of Health and local government to build its capacity to respond to its citizensí rights.

Working with NGOs to adopt a similar approach will present great challenges to the U.N. mission, but is imperative if the rights-based approach is to succeed in Haiti. NGOs can serve as vehicles for Haitians to realize their rights by focusing on the capacity-building of the government, mobilization of local communities, dissemination of information, and improving transparency.[32] Additionally NGOs can facilite a dialogue that allows Haitians to articulate their rights and ensure that the complaint mechanism is working as Haitians make demands on their government.[33]

VI. Resources: International Funding and Personnel

The proposal recommends an approach that is unlike those used by the U.N. in the past and will have specific impacts on funding and personnel.

Haiti depends on international assistance to deliver services and fulfill many of its human rights obligations. Therefore, implementing the proposed programs and long term capacity building required for a durable peace in Haiti requires substantial international funding. The international community, through international financial institutional and bilateral aid will need to begin reengaging with Haiti immediately.[34] The international community must remain engaged in Haiti until, and even after, the Haitian government has the infrastructure and capacity to respond to its citizensí rights and needs.

In order to combat donor fatigue and overcome capacity absorption and corruption obstacles, specialists will be needed to work with the government to develop and implement accounting mechanisms. These experts can be drawn from donor countries or the OAS.

The U.N. Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) typically heads peace-keeping missions. Its budget comes from assessed contributions. DPKO-run peace-keeping missions employ large numbers of personnel, but are very limited or generally have no budget for programming. Conversely, U.N. agencies such as the U.N. Development Programmme (UNDP) or the World Health Organization (WHO) generally have proportionally larger budgets for programming, which they primarily receive from voluntary contributions, but limited personnel. Furthermore, the timeframe from programmatic inception to disbursement within agencies can range from six months to three years. The human rights violations in Haiti require urgent attention and cannot be dealt with using that timeframe.

To ensure the mission has the technical capacity to accomplish its mandate, personnel need to be drawn from sources beyond DPKO. Bilateral assistance is an efficient way to address this problem. Countries, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean have a unique expertise that can be easily transferred to Haiti. Instead of sending bilateral aid to Haiti, countries can invest in Haitiís future by providing experts for sector development projects. For example, Brazil or Cuba could provide experts for the health sector development program. Similarly, various U.N. agencies and other international bodies, such as the O.A.S. can provide personnel for other program areas. While an interdisciplinary mission comprised of all relevant agencies and international actors presents the benefit of technical expertise, it also entails the distinct challenge of coordinating funding and ensuring that it is accessible quickly enough to allow the programs to succeed.

The U.N. mission framework can be implemented with a combined effort that allows for adequate personnel and programmatic funding. In order for local Haitian communities to trust the U.N. mission and in turn the Haitian government, the mission must be able to deliver quickly. Likewise, each community will present different human rights violations and will therefore require different responses. Mission personnel must have the flexibility to deal with such situations. The ìquick impact projectsî model, developed by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) allows U.N. missions to access funds expediently and quickly implement programs that produce measurable outcomes. This should be incorporated into the mission framework, with mission funds set aside for this purpose. [35]

Conclusion

Haiti presents a powerful opportunity for the U.N. to break out of its typical peace-keeping paradigm and make a lasting contribution to the Haitian people. It is a costly proposition, but vital in the long run. The U.N. should rise to this challenge and address the present political violence and violence engendered by extreme poverty, both of which take innocent lives on a daily basis. Anything less will only serve to perpetuate the previously unsuccessful pattern of U.N. missions to Haiti.

1. http://www.un.org/rights/micivih/rapports/crisis.htm (Aug. 1993).
2. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmihmandate.html.
3. ìThe observers [w]ere ill-prepared to fulfill such a broad mandate.† [M]oreover, training in investigations and reporting violations was nonexistent, as was the equipment (computers, radios, vehicles) necessary to do the job.î Id. at 103.
4. This will be done in accordance with the Millennium Development Goals and recognizing that ìÖthe promotion and protection of human rights is a bedrock requirement for the realization of the Charterís vision of a just and peaceful world,î Strengthening the United Nations: an agenda for further change, 9 September 2002. Para.45, A/57/287. The proposed mandate follows the guidelines agreed upon at the U.N. Interagency Workshop on a Human Rights-Based Approach (May 3-5, 2003), as laid out in ìThe Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation Towards a Common Understanding Among the U.N. Agencies.î
5. The sector development programs address specific human rights as noted by the program names.† This is to highlight the citizensí rights to these programs and the governmentís obligation to fulfill these rights.†
6. ì[Haiti] is the poorest country in the western hemisphere and the routine violation of its peopleís basic rights (rights to food, education, health, and decent housing) is just as important a factor in political instability and the potential for violence as the failure to respect civil and political rights, if not more so.î Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Independent Expert Mr. Louis Joinet, E/CN.4/2003/116 (23 December 2002).
7. This in no way negates the value of humanitarian aid, but rather advocates for changing the overall framework that the international community has employed in Haiti.
8. See generally UNICEF, Guidelines for Human-Rights Based Programming Approach (1998) and the UNDP policy document Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable Development (1998).
9. Participants included representatives from: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN Food and Agricultural Organization, International Labor Organization, OHCHR, UNAIDS, UNDP, UN Education , Scientific and Cultural Organization, UN Population Fund, UNICEF, and UN Industrial Development Organization.
10. The Second Interagency Workshop on Implementing a Human Rights-Based Approach in the Context of U.N. Reform (Stamford, USA, 5-7 May 2003).
11. Unofficial sources estimate that only 1000 officers remain in the police force as of April 1, 2004.
12. ìHaiti Police Hunt Looters, Council Mulls New Government,î 6 March 2004; www.alternet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N06449033.htm.
13. Prosecution for past misdeeds must not result in the governmentís inability to deal with the present situation and ensure due process rights.† The governmentís capacity to respect the rule of law must be considered in determining which prosecutions to focus on.
14. Section J, 1987 Haitian Constitution, Article 9, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
15. Article 24, 1987 Haitian Constitution, Article 9 and 14, ICCPR.
16. ìSituation of Human Rights in Haiti,î prepared by Independent Expert, Mr. Louis Joinet (23 December 2002), E/CN.4/2003/116.
17. Article 19, 1987 Haitian Constitution.
18. 123 out of 1,000 children under age five die in Haiti.† UNICEF, At a Glance, www.unicef.org/infobycountry/haiti.html.
19. Millennium Development Goal 7, Target 10.
20. Article 32, 1987 Haitian Constitution, Article 7 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Millennium Development Goal 2, Target 3.
21. ìCorresponding to rights-holders, there must be duty-bearers who are responsible for ensuring that rights are fulfilled.† But the concept of duty is useless if the duty-bearers cannot be held to account for any failure to discharge their duties.† Monitoring and accountability is, therefore, an essential feature of the human rights approach.î Prof. Paul Hunt, Prof. Siddiq Osmani, Prof. Manfred Novak, Summary of the Draft Guidelines on a Human Rights Based Approach to Poverty Reduction, March 2004.
22. This can be done at the national or local level, but must be a participatory process with Haitian citizens.
23. This will also include providing technical assistance to ensure transparency and the necessary absorption capacity to handle the input of international funds.
24. Peace-keeping missions generally limit local staff to non-professional posts.† The proposed Mission will incorporate professional staff and ensure that they are integrated into sustainable post-Mission positions.
25. There will be crossover between agency personnel working on peace-building programs (e.g. OHCHR may be involved in rule of law projects and UNDP may be involved in strengthening infrastructure).
26. If the Mission includes military personnel, they will be charged with demobilization and disarmament.
27. This is essential to change the dynamic between the state and the people.
28. For example, the Ministry of Health has been looted and several UCS (health clinics) have been destroyed.
29. It will be important to maintain the rule of law in Haiti and ensure that the local officials are constitutionally selected.† Under the Haitian Constitution, department delegates and vice delegates are to be appointed by the president of Haiti, not the prime minister.
30. A copy of the Cange Declaration is available at www.pih.org.
31. Note that not all NGOs will be working with the government.† NGOs will also play an active role in monitoring the government and the international communityís actions within Haiti.† For example, NGOs may bring legal actions on behalf of Haitians, against the Government of Haiti, international financial institutions, or the international community if their human rights are violated.†
32. In many cases this process is already underway.
33. The Brahimi Report advocates for mission heads to have the authority to apply a small percentage of mission funds to ìquick impact projects.î Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., para.37, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (2000).